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THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 
NOVELIST of his day said of Lamartine that he had A raised History to  the level of Fiction. T h e  fear of 
earning similar praise has made many another historian tell 
a simple story of events which sometimes seem unrelated to  
all that came before o r  after. But in stern times like these 
it is more than ever evident, as Morley has so finely said, 
that “We are all of us a good many hundreds of thousands 
of years old two minutes after we find our way into the mid- 
wife’s arms,” and also this from the same wise man, that 
“Progress is a working belief that the modern world will 
never consent to  do without.’’ T h e  historian may safely 
write in the light of this belief, i f  he only keep in mind what 
Oliver Cromwell said to  the Presbyterian elders, “ M y  
brethren, in the name of Christ, I beseech you to  think it 
possible that you may be mistaken I ”  
T o  judge the work of statesmen by future events to them 
unknown o r  only dimly guessed seems scarcely fair;  and yet 
it is the only test which can ever be applied. All statesman- 
ship must ever have something of the prophetic quality. T h e  
judgment of posterity is the truest measure of a man’s great- 
ness. Did he read aright the principles of progress and of 
life? Did he guide his own generation in such a way as to  
prepare the way for other generations to  live in better times? 
Or did he only solve the immediate problem and leave his 
real task to  be performed by some wiser man? These are 
the questions which we must ask of the men of other ages; 
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and especially in these days, when surely another peace con- 
ference will be meeting, these are the questions which we 
must ask of Metternich, of Talleyrand, of Napoleon, and 
of Disraeli. 
History is the study of some period in the life of men in 
the light of some future. Every day throws all the past into 
new perspective and demands a new emphasis and a new 
explanation. Incidents and men which seemed insignificant 
yesterday, to-day are chosen as the important realities of 
their times. I t  is for  this reason that even if no new docu- 
ments are brought to light and no new episodes are discov- 
ered, there must ever be a new history in every age. T h e  
supreme function of the historian as distinguished from the 
mere annalist is always selective. H e  does not necessarily 
take his stand on the present o r  the imagined future and 
select his past to explain that present o r  future, but he must 
inevitably take that stand on some position beyond the one 
he is describing. Otherwise there is no possibility of feeling 
the sweep of events o r  of choosing any scheme to reduce 
their multiplicity to order. And the surest and most inter- 
esting standpoint for  the study of any period, however 
remote, is usually either the present o r  some period not too 
distant which is still living in imagination with all the rich 
connotations of reality. 
No one can hope that historical work will really be final 
any more than one can hope that work in any living science 
will be final. To-morrow and day after to-morrow our his- 
tory will inevitably be different, not only in the extent of its 
content but also in its fundamental and scarcely defined point 
of selection. Even the scientific German historians were 
absolutely unable to tell the story of the Roman Empire or  
of the Papacy without showing in every line what it was 
which had significance for their own age. Complete detach- 
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ment would be not a virtue but a calamity, for  a t  the best 
even truth is necessarily relative. 
It is this never ending and seemingly hopeless quest which 
makes history neither the past life of man itself, for that is 
too vast and beyond discovery, nor the documents and books 
which are stored up in musty libraries, important and for- 
gotten, but a living study of a past which shall illumine and 
give hope and significance to some present, either lingering 
in our memories of yesterday o r  yet only dimly realized and 
expected. I n  his forward look the historian is like the states- 
man, and History stands like Statesmanship with the ruddy 
glow of the dawn of future ages shining on her upturned 
face. 
In  such a spirit, when the next great peace congress shall 
meet, to-morrow o r  day after to-morrow, whether it shall 
go down into history as the Congress of Amsterdam, o r  
Madrid,  o r  Antwerp is comparatively insignificant. Wha t  
will really matter is whether it has within it enough of genius 
and good will to make its work a landmark in the progress 
of the human spirit. H o w  will it differ in the men who com- 
pose it, in the methods which they pursue, in the principles 
which guide them, and in the ends which they achieve from 
those five o r  six great congresses of other ages? 
Before the time of the Thirty Years’ W a r  there were no 
international congresses for the very good reason that na- 
tions and states in the modern sense of these terms were just 
crystallizing out of the welter of the Middle Ages. W e  are  
so familiar with the idea of a state living its more o r  less 
sovereign life among its fellows that it is easy to forget what 
a really new thing is a world composed of separate states 
living together in a family, with their rivalries and quarrels, 
and with the necessity of building up a new code of morals, 
or of law, corresponding to the older, ever changing means 
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of social control of individuals which have been building 
from the earliest days of human society. T h e  ancient world 
knew either tribes which were regularly at war with all alien 
tribes and which were not limited by any such modern inven- 
tions as definite territorial limits o r  frontiers, o r  else it knew 
great empires which united all these racial groups by mili- 
tary prowess and by the fiction of common heritage. T h e  
intense rivalry of wandering tribes reappeared in the Middle 
Ages, and seemed to swallow all there was of civilization in 
the devouring flood of their invasions. T h e  old idea of unity 
still lived on in theory in the Holy Roman Empire, whose 
essential qualities were best described in the famous sarcasm 
of Voltaire. But order reappeared only when tribes had 
succumbed to those warlike rulers, the nobles, and these in 
turn had been united by the prowess and the paid armies of 
the kings, the real founders of that very modern human 
institution which we call the State. A state, in the sense of 
a group of people living together within a definite territory, 
having an orderly civilization, and bound together by the 
invisible bond of a common allegiance and a common loy- 
alty, certainly did not exist on the face of the earth much 
before the beginning of the seventeenth century. There  
were, of course, groups of people who already had many of 
the marks of the state, but in a general sense it is safe to say 
that men knew kings, and churches, and families, and tribes, 
and empires long before they knew states; and even in the 
sixteenth century no amount of explanation could really have 
made a man understand what we now mean by patriotism, 
nor why the Englishman stands with uncovered head at the 
strains of his national anthem, nor what the Stars and Stripes 
means to an American. Fo r  these are ideas which belong to 
the realm of deep feeling rather than of pure reason, and 
are not to be reduced to the cold limits of a syllogism. 
The Congress of Vienna 43 
T h e  Congress of Westphalia, which closed in 1648, was 
the first great international congress of any kind. F o r  this 
reason alone it is certainly one of the supremely significant 
events in the history of the world. Although some of its 
problems now seem remote, yet it is to be remembered as 
the mark of a new era, and, i f  for  nothing else, as the point 
at which the influence of that great jurist, Hugo Grotius, 
began to teach men new ideas of international right and 
wrong at the very dawn of the society of nations. In  the 
following century another congress sat at Utrecht, settling 
affairs of great moment to the powers involved, and fur- 
nishing another early precedent for  the international con- 
gresses which were to be so important a feature of European 
history in the age of Metternich. These earlier congresses 
were genuinely international, but, in their composition and 
their etiquette, they sometimes seemed assemblies of princes 
and kings rather than gatherings of sovereign and indepen- 
dent nations. Their  problems, too, have something of the 
mediaval flavor. It is only when we get to the Congress of 
Vienna that we meet our distinctively modern problems and 
find as if in solution those ideas which are the centre of the 
immense conflict of to-day. 
T h e  world had gone a long distance forward in the hun- 
dred years which lay between Utrecht and Vienna. At 
Utrecht the slave trade was still regarded merely as a valu- 
able commercial privilege which bore no relation a t  all to  
morals o r  to law. England sought and gained for  herself 
the monopoly of the trade between Africa and the Spanish 
empire in America. At  Vienna, the English representatives, 
under the influence of Wilberforce, took the lead in securing 
the passage of a resolution in which all the states promised 
to do their best to secure the abolition of the iniquitous busi- 
ness. T h e  promise was none too definite, since no special 
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date was mentioned a t  which it was to  be fulfilled; but in 
spite of this defect it was clearly a step in advance. Just as 
the humanitarian ideas of which Bentham was the prophet 
were behind this provision, so the influence of Adam Smith 
and the classical economists appeared in the measure, also 
adopted unanimously, that  international rivers should be 
open to the commerce of all. This  idea applied especially 
to  the Rhine, and has since been greatly expanded in special 
treaties. I t  is under this principle that American vessels 
have free passage through the waters of the St. Lawrence, 
and that most of the other great rivers of the world are 
open to the commerce of the nations. T h e  opening of the 
Scheldt, by which Antwerp gained access to the sea, had been 
bitterly opposed by England for  fear that the Belgian city 
might come to  be a rival to her own great port of London. 
This had been one of the reasons which had led her to de- 
clare war against the French Republic in 1793. But now 
all were willing to have this very important river, which rises 
in Belgium and reaches the sea in Holland, made one of the 
great doors which lead into northern Europe. As a result, 
at the opening of the present war  Antwerp had become the 
third port in the world. T h e  nations which are to-day fight- 
ing for  the redemption of Antwerp are in reality fighting for 
a principle which was definitely established at the Congress 
of Vienna. I n  opening the rivers the congress was really 
saying that above the special interests and desires of each 
individual state there are rights which belong to all. It was 
the first small plank in a common law for  the nations which 
was to  serve as a limitation on the idea of absolute and 
unlimited sovereignty. And it takes no great prophet to 
foresee that the time will come, however slowly, when states 
will recognize that complete sovereignty is as impossible in 
The Congress of Vienna 45 
a world of other states as complete liberty is to the indi- 
vidual in a society of other individuals. 
T h e  occasion for the Congress of Vienna was as dramatic 
as it well could be. Only two years before it opened, Napo- 
leon had entered Russia on the expedition which was to 
light the flame of national patriotism among the blazing 
ruins of Moscow. Wha t  kings had been unable to accom- 
plish, the aroused people of Europe did at the Battle of the 
Nations, which set the seal of defeat on the grand army of 
the Empire and drove its once invincible hosts in flight back 
across the Rhine, on that perhaps most memorable of all 
October days, just a year before our diplomats arrived at 
Vienna. T h e  military genius of the great soldier was never 
quite so supremely great as it was in the marvellous cam- 
paign in which he sought to stave off the inevitable and to 
save his capital and his throne. Fighting against vastly 
superior numbers, he balked and then defeated them, caus- 
ing them to  fall back by the rapier-like thrust of his little 
army against their line of communications, until finally the 
supreme gambler had played his last card and his enemies 
had bivouacked in triumph in the streets of Paris. Even 
then, in utter disregard of human life, he would have thrown 
his brave men on the entrenchments of his own late capital 
if it had not been for the defection of Marshal Marmont. 
“I am still the man of Wagram and of Austerlitz!” he 
exclaimed when he heard that Paris had fallen; and even 
with his abdication signed he sprang from his seat and said 
to his assembled marshals, who had certainly served him 
well on many a hard-fought field: “Gentlemen, let us tear it 
up. We can beat them yet.” But they were disillusioned, 
discouraged, and inexorable, and so the man of Wagram 
became for  the moment the man of Elba. 
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When Paris was about to fall, Napoleon had ordered all 
his official family to leave the city and to join him outside. 
Among them was Talleyrand, who had been the grand 
chamberlain of the empire ever since it was created in 1804. 
Talleyrand was one of those adroit men to whom accidents 
always happen opportunely. During the trial of Louis XVI 
the famous chest was discovered back of the wainscoting 
where the royal carpenter had placed it with all its incrimi- 
nating documents. Among the contents were papers which 
our good bishop of Autun might have found most difficult to 
explain to the satisfaction of even so mild a man as Roland. 
Fo r  Talleyrand was not only a bishop, having been kept 
from the army in his youth by a hereditary lameness, but he 
was also the chief author of the famous civil constitution of 
the clergy, which placed the priests under the control of the 
state. At  the very moment when he was carefully buttering 
his bread on one side by this very radical measure, he was 
also in communication with the royal family, trying to help 
Mirabeau to preserve the monarchy in some more satisfac- 
tory and constitutional guise. Letters to royal personages, 
however innocent they might have seemed when written, 
were evidently not good forms of life insurance in the year 
of the September massacres, when France was surrounded 
by her enemies and when great Danton was arousing her to 
action with his “L’audace, encore l’audace, toujours l’audace, 
et la France est sauvie!” Fortunately for him, when these 
embarrassing letters fell into the hands of Roland, Talley- 
rand was also helping to save France on an unofficial diplo- 
matic mission at London. If Louis had not been guillotined, 
as he so richly deserved to be, Talleyrand might have per- 
suaded Pitt to keep England out of the war and so changed 
greatly the course of human history. I t  is probable that 
even then the Scheldt might have rankled in her generous 
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soul even more than the death of the stupid king. How- 
ever that might have been, Talleyrand failed in his first im- 
portant diplomatic venture not because he was not a great 
diplomat, but because the stars in their courses had fought 
against him, as they have frequently done against other 
lesser diplomats before and since. 
Needless to say, our bland bishop with the club-foot did 
not return to Paris. Instead he travelled for his health in 
America, living in Philadelphia, seeing everything which 
might be learned superficially, and failing wholly to under- 
stand the spirit of the young Republic, as he showed soon 
after his return to France. There  times had greatly 
changed. Danton and Robespierre were dead. T h e  cannon 
of VendCmiaire had awakened France from her dreams. 
Talleyrand became the minister of foreign affairs in the 
Directory. It was in this connection that he appears in 
American history as the central figure of the incident of the 
“X Y 2” despatches. H i s  utter contempt for the American 
representatives, who came to secure some redress for the 
injuries which their neutral commerce was suffering at the 
hands of France, his attempts to turn their plea to his own 
financial account through blackmail, the ringing words of 
President Adams, and the naval war which followed are the 
subjects of another story. 
Talleyrand’s picture has been drawn in two chapters of 
Carlyle’s great epic. H e  first appears in “The Procession” 
as one of the members of the National Assembly, and again 
his very soul is placed before us in the passage in which the 
Scotch historian describes the strange Festival of the Con- 
federation, that assembly in which was celebrated the fall of 
the Bastille. Talleyrand ascended the elevated altar in the 
midst of the pouring rain, in full canonicals, his mitre on his 
head, and around his waist the tricolored sash of the nation. 
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It was on this occasion that he is said to have turned to one 
of his companions, just as the solemn religious festival was 
about to begin, and whispered : “Don’t make me laugh !” 
Napoleon himself has left on record a short and pithy 
character sketch of his minister. On their last interview in 
1814 he said: “You are a coward, a liar, a thief. You do 
not believe even in God. You would sell your own father.” 
But then Napoleon may have been prejudiced, though he 
certainly had every reason to recognize a master liar when 
he saw one, belonging himself to the very first rank of the 
great liars of history. Talleyrand, like FouchC, had been a 
man of too keen intellectual powers to serve even a master 
like Napoleon blindly. H e  used his important position to 
secure for  himself a great fortune extracted from the un- 
lucky princes along the Rhine who lost their estates to make 
room for  the simpler administrative arrangements which 
Napoleon determined to  introduce. But he recognized f a r  
sooner than his master the strength of the dawning spirit 
of nationality. H e  advised Napoleon against his Spanish 
adventure, and later, a t  the time of the expedition into 
Russia, said, “This is the beginning of the end!” Napoleon 
resented his advice, and in a spirit of sardonic humor made 
his disgraced minister the unwilling host of the Spanish 
princes kidnapped at  Bayonne. Talleyrand was compelled 
to entertain them in his country palace, and he well knew 
that his own safety depended on the care with which he 
guarded Charles and Ferdinand. H i s  master added insult 
to injury by commanding the former bishop to marry the 
lady with whom scandal had connected his name. Evidently 
the two men had only small reason to love each other. But 
with all the servant’s avarice and hypocrisy, this much we 
can say for  him which we could not say for the greater man, 
He always loved France well, and when the moment came 
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he served her with the full measure of devotion. And never 
more so than in those busy months at Vienna, when he, the 
master intriguer of his age, always excepting his rival 
FouchC, for  the lily may not be painted, rose to heights of 
statesmanship which have placed all future ages in his debt, 
and which set France, doubly defeated and discredited as 
she was, high at the council table of the nations. So com- 
plex are the strands which enter into human character, that 
we might picture Talleyrand either as a contemptible villain 
o r  as the hero of a great historic drama, in either case with 
almost equal truth. T o  Carlyle a man must be either a hero 
o r  a fool. Fortunately, in history as in life, the hero and the 
fool often live together in the same man, all logic to  the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
Napoleon never liked o r  trusted Talleyrand, and yet he 
could not get along without him. H e  used him as foreign 
minister under the Consulate, then made him grand chan- 
cellor of the empire at a salary of half a million francs, and 
later placed him in the Principality of Benevento, a danger- 
ous honor of which Talleyrand managed to get rid just be- 
fore he was to take still a new rdle in the drama of the times. 
And so it happened that when all the other ministers of 
Napoleon left Paris, adroit unlucky Talleyrand reached the 
barrier just too late and was turned back. So, too, when the 
allies entered Paris in triumph, there was our good friend 
Talleyrand, the one important man in the capital, ready to 
be the host of Alexander, whom he had met before, and, 
above all, ready to give wise advice as to the new order of 
things both in France and in Europe. And he had to deal 
with two men quite as remarkable in their own way as him- 
self. There  was Metternich, the man of principle, minister 
in chief to an old woman called Francis of Austria. And 
there, too, was Alexander, Czar  of all the Russias, the man 
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of visions and of dreams. A new Joseph was required who 
could state the principle and interpret the visions, and yet 
make all serve France. And Talleyrand, who had been pon- 
dering these things in his heart for six long years while he 
served as an unwilling jailer, was not unequal to  the task. 
T h e  principle was the idea of legitimacy and the dream was 
a dream of peace and of eternal good will. 
Next to  Talleyrand, the most interesting figure at  the con- 
gress was the emperor Alexander I, who had been the Czar  
of Russia since 1801. Napoleon, who was a keen judge of 
men, said of Alexander: “With so many intellectual advan- 
tages and dazzling qualities, . . . there is always some- 
thing lacking in him, . . . and that which is lacking changes 
perpetually.” H e  was a man of very great personal charm, 
and considerable personal vanity. H e  seized upon ideas as 
with a sudden inspiration, and with the greatest eagerness. 
H e  passed from one idea which he regarded as a funda- 
mental truth to  its exact opposite by intermediate steps of 
which he was not conscious. Alexander loved truly the two 
ideas of liberty and order. Could they be reconciled? Met- 
ternich was sure that they could not, and never wavered in 
his preference for an order based on historic institutions and 
historic obligations. Alexander thought that liberty might 
be made to fall like the gentle showers from kingly heavens 
upon the waiting people. H e  found instead that it welled 
up in a mighty torrent, creative and destructive at the same 
time. I t  would not obey the voice of single men, however 
divinely sent to  control its floods. And so the liberal mood 
passed into one of reactionary gloom. 
Alexander had been brought up a t  the court of his grand- 
mother, the notorious and brilliant Catharine 11. Between 
his grandmother and his father, Paul, there existed the most 
violent antipathy. Paul was a whimsical lunatic, like his son 
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Constantine after him, and Catharine, who, in spite of her 
notorious immorality, had much of the far-sighted states- 
manship of the wide-eyed Elizabeth, was determined that he 
should never succeed her as the ruler of Russia. She loved 
Alexander with all that was best in her strong nature, and 
intended him to be her heir. But the boy had in him a cer- 
tain filial loyalty which would not let him supplant his father. 
There  is something pitiful in the way in which the old wo- 
man, hard and self-sufficient as she was to all the rest of the 
world, tried in vain to gain her grandson’s respect and aff ec- 
tion. But he always resented his enforced separation from 
his father and mother, and must have come early to under- 
stand something of the air of intrigue and wickedness which 
surrounded his imperial grandmother’s throne. H e  there- 
fore gave his boyish loyalty and full devotion to his tutor, 
the Swiss La Harpe. La Harpe  was an idealist and a politi- 
cal liberal, and he gained an influence over his young pupil’s 
mind which Alexander was never able to shake off. Even 
after L a  Harpe  was deemed too radical and dismissed, the 
man and the boy kept up an intimate correspondence; and 
to this day the letters of Alexander to  L a  Harpe  are 
among the most interesting of unconscious self-revelations. 
From his tutor the boy learned simple tastes and a certain 
genuine purity and nobility of character. H e  became a lib- 
eral in feeling, and in later years his life was a constant con- 
flict between what he thought were his convictions and the 
necessities which were pressed upon him by his family and 
position. 
When Alexander was eighteen years of age, Catharine 
died, full of dread for the years ahead and certain of her  
own high place in the history of Russia. T h e  five years of 
Paul’s mad reign were a terrible experience to his son no less 
than to Russia. Catharine had been sensual and ruthless, 
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but she was also strong, far-seeing, statesmanlike. Paul was 
a madman with imperial power. One can guess something 
of the contents of those five years when we know that until 
recently all mention of his acts and of his tragic death has 
been under the ban of the most absolute censorship in Russia. 
If one finds disorder in the Russia of to-day, it does not 
necessarily prove that there is too much democracy now, but 
rather perhaps that in other days there has been too little. 
And every day of anarchy among a people breaking their 
bonds and struggling into light can be matched by years of 
tyranny and sore oppression under kings whose title went 
straight back to God himself. W e  cannot judge aright these 
bitter days unless we remember also the burden and the woe 
of those long and very bitter years. And one may hope still 
that out of the ashes and the bloodshed of this wicked war 
there may yet arise a Russia with a new glory blazing in her 
kindled soul. 
Paul was determined that his son should not gain any 
popularity at his expense, and with mad cunning he made 
the boy, who was only twenty, chief of police in St. Peters- 
burg. In  this capacity Alexander was compelled to sign 
orders of banishment and death for  people whom he knew 
to be innocent, “that all may see that you and I breathe with 
the same spirit,” as Paul said to his son. Paul reduced the 
required service of the peasants to three days a week, and 
when they refused to be grateful and insisted on revolting, 
he had them executed and buried outside the cemetery walls 
with an epitaph over their graves: “Here lie criminals be- 
fore the Lord, the Czar,  and the landowners, justly pun- 
ished according to God’s law.” Citizens were punished for 
wearing round hats and top-boots which came from France. 
Thousands were executed for failing to kneel when the 
imperial carriage passed. In  his last escapade Paul fell 
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under the sinister influence of Napoleon and sent an expedi- 
tion of forty thousand Cossacks across the plains and moun- 
tains to wrest India from the British. Each Cossack had 
two horses but no forage or provisions. In  obedience to 
their Little Father, they went out into the barren steppes to  
die, forerunners of those other Russian armies of later days, 
which by the insane stupidity o r  treachery of their superiors 
were to die without food in the Crimea, o r  without ammuni- 
tion in Manchuria, o r  without guns on the slopes of the 
Carpathians. 
Finally Alexander yielded to the courtiers and reluctantly 
entered a conspiracy. It seems that his father’s blood does 
not rest upon his memory. H e  had promised to become czar 
if his father’s personal safety were secured. Tha t  night Paul 
was dethroned and murdered, and this event cast a gloom 
over Alexander’s sensitive and naturally affectionate nature 
which clouded all his days. H e  could not punish the mur- 
derers, for they were his fellow conspirators and friends, 
and Russia was then, as ever, in reality an oligarchy with the 
forms of royalty. But he never ceased to blame himself for 
his father’s death. 
All this had happened fourteen years before Alexander 
arrived, last of the important figures who gathered a t  
Vienna. H e  had already shown considerable diplomatic 
skill, especially when he gained Bessarabia from Turkey, and 
Finland from Sweden, and yet managed to  keep both coun- 
tries on his side in his impending war with Napoleon. In 
his own country, Alexander had proved sometimes as abso- 
lute as Catharine, again as liberal as his good old friend 
La Harpe. To  each mood was added much of the mysticism 
of all the Romanoffs. With all his brilliance and his charm, 
was there also in his melancholy something of his father’s 
and his brother’s madness? It may well have been. H e  
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came to Vienna in person to make sure that Russia received 
as an independent kingdom the whole of Poland which was 
already occupied by his armies, and to see that his friends, the 
kings of Sweden and of Prussia, were properly rewarded for 
the sacrifices which he had called on them to make. H e  was 
determined that Bernadotte should not fail to get Norway, 
and that Prussia should be rewarded for  the loss of her 
Polish provinces at the expense of the unlucky King of Sax- 
ony. Fo r  bargains are bargains, and doubtless Alexander 
had learned from L a  Harpe  that honor is a duty even among 
kings. 
T h e  Czar  found all Europe gathered at Vienna when he 
arrived,-all Europe, it must be said, with three o r  four 
quite significant exceptions. F o r  example, among the ab- 
sent there was the protector of the faithful, Mahmoud 11, 
Sultan of Turkey, who was not concerned at all with the 
business in hand, since Alexander had already got Bessa- 
rabia by the treaty of Bucharest in I 8 I 2. Then there were 
those who were quite too intimately concerned to be com- 
fortable companions. Conspicuous by their absence from so 
brilliant an assembly of more than a hundred kings, princes, 
and great diplomats were the King of Saxony, for  he was 
confidently expected to furnish the entrie for the gathering, 
and the King of Denmark, an old friend of Napoleon’s who 
was counted on to supply the dessert. For  our diplomats 
were distinctly not there for  their health. In  much the same 
class was Murat,  the King of Naples, whose plebeian origin 
and family connection with the deposed Emperor would be 
especially hard to tuck safely under Talleyrand’s warm bed- 
quilt of legitimacy. And among the exceptions we must not 
forget the King of Elba, late Bonaparte, master of  the 
destinies of Europe, now busy with his gardening. H e  was 
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not invited, but, not standing on any ceremony, was doubtless 
planning even then to be on time to break up the party. 
All that summer which lay between the preliminary ar- 
rangements by which eight powers signed the peace of Paris 
and the great meeting of the diplomats at  Vienna was a time 
full of high hopes and expectations among the liberals of 
Europe. By some wonderful magic, arrangements were to 
be made which would forever reconcile the two principles of 
liberty and order. From the standpoint of to-day we can 
readily see what were the real consequences of the Napo- 
leonic era in Europe. These, beyond any question, are the 
reestablishment of the British empire, whose foundations 
had been severely shaken in the American war ;  the awaken- 
ing of the spirit of nationality, especially in Germany under 
the burning words of Fichte and the great leadership of 
Stein; and the spread of the French notions of constitutional 
liberty and equality. Russia, Germany, Italy, and France 
could never be again what they had been before. But the 
men who went to Vienna were too close to these results to 
see them in their full significance, and the event showed that 
much of what the liberals desired was to be postponed to  
other days, and that they must win their goal by their own 
efforts. T o  Metternich it seemed that the world wanted 
peace and not liberty. T h e  past, and not the future, became 
the guide of the deliberations, and Chateaubriand, with his 
shallow notions, was their prophet. T h e  same love for an 
idealized past, a past full of gallant knights and gentle 
ladies dealing kindly with an essentially inferior population, 
which produced such remarkable effects in religion and in 
literature, was also the sentimental notion which replaced 
Louis XVII I  on his throne and which led the authors of the 
restoration to see, o r  rather to pretend to see, in the indolent, 
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clever, and gouty king a true representative of kingly hero- 
ism. T h e  age of Napoleon seemed a time full of sound and 
fury. Men remembered how in the spring of 1813 the peas- 
ants of two provinces of Russia had gathered up the bodies 
of more than ninety thousand men which had been lying all 
winter unburied in the snow. T h e  past alone had healing 
for  the wounds of the present. 
T h e  idea of legitimacy, of which Talleyrand was the 
author, and which he used so cleverly for his own purposes, 
was readily accepted by Metternich as the exact statement 
of his own most profound convictions. T o  Talleyrand it 
was a weapon which might well serve his ends and then be 
modified and even discarded without a tear. But to Metter- 
nich it was an abiding principle of action from which he 
never consciously swerved and which he believed in just as 
truly when, many years later, it drove him in flight from 
Vienna, as he did when it was first declared as the funda- 
mental policy of the Congress of Vienna. “I do not know 
how to compromise,” he wrote in 1848 to Nicholas of 
Russia, and his whole career was a commentary on this 
statement. If loyalty and sincerity are the supreme ethical 
qualities, then Metternich was a virtuous man. In  a spirit 
of perfect consistency he later framed the doctrine of inter- 
vention which sent an Austrian army to restore Ferdinand 
of Naples to his absolute authority, and a French army 
across the Pyrenees into Spain to put down revolution there. 
This same idea of legitimacy also made Metternich unwill- 
ing to have anything to do with the rising rebellion in Greece 
which was to begin the dismemberment of the Turkish em- 
pire and to introduce the so-called Eastern Question into the 
deliberations of Europe. 
But this principle as it was first explained by Talleyrand 
to Alexander in Paris was not necessarily the wholly 
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reactionary idea which it became in the hands of the relent- 
less Metternich. It meant simply that mere conquest should 
not be allowed to give title in a well-ordered world. Changes 
in the shape and size of states should be based upon broad 
historic considerations. Although it was actually invoked to 
safeguard the property rights of certain kings in their gov- 
ernments, it is essentially capable of being used to-day in a 
modified form which is, after all, not so very different from 
Talleyrand’s first version. Its spirit would say to an assem- 
bled world to-day, not what Metternich made it say in the 
two decades after the Congress of Vienna, “Kings shall 
never be dethroned,” but rather this : “Power alone shall not 
settle the question of Belgium. National rights, popular 
aspiration, legitimate economic hopes must determine the 
ownership of Macedonia, of Trieste and the Dalmatian 
coast.” And interpreted thus in the interests of people, and 
not of kings and governments, it is yet a principle to which 
every thoughtful liberal might well subscribe. 
At  Vienna this idea of legitimacy, which might have been 
broadened and made genuinely fruitful, was used in a few 
cases and was then discarded in the interest of what seemed 
the more immediate requirements of the hour. To  France, 
f a r  more than to the Bourbons, it rendered an inestimable 
service, for  it really performed a miracle. H e r  historic 
bounds were restored to her practically intact, and even 
after the return of Napoleon and the disaster a t  Waterloo 
she lost only Savoy, which was to  be restored to her later 
under the influence of Cavour, and some comparatively un- 
important frontier fortresses. T h e  real criticism of the 
diplomats of Vienna is not that they clung too closely to  the 
idea of legitimacy in their territorial settlements, but rather 
that they interpreted it too narrowly and that they departed 
from it too often either in the spirit of cowardice or of utter 
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selfishness. For in reality the only important application of 
the idea was made in May  at the peace of Paris, which guar- 
anteed independence and favorable frontiers to France, 
rather than at  the congress itself. 
In  the important settlement which the congress made of 
the question of Piedmont, the little state which was to be the 
cradle of Italian unity, it was perfectly evident that the idea 
of legitimacy was no longer dominant. T h e  reactionary 
king, who had been living in Sardinia under the protection 
of English gunboats, was recalled and his territories were 
increased, not in the interests of any principle of justice, but 
so that there might be a real buffer state to stand between 
the French and the wide-spread Austrian lands in the Valley 
of the Po. Metternich feared with all his soul that some 
day a new Napoleon might arise and, invoking the memory 
of the dead hero, might again sweep across those rich and 
ill-gotten lands with new legions of another French republic 
or empire. H e  could little have foreseen that in less than 
half a century this same little state which he had placed in 
the gate of Italy, transformed and glorified by the self-sacri- 
fice of one man, a king who kept his promises, and strength- 
ened by the genius of another, the greatest diplomat and 
statesman of his day, with the aid of the nephew of the 
exiled Emperor, would, on the bloody battle-fields of Ma-  
genta and Solferino, bring to an end all the carefully bal- 
anced results of this great congress. Legitimacy required that 
Venice, conquered by the Corsican, should be restored; but 
that rich state, future home of Manin, was added to  Austria. 
T h e  ancient Republic of Genoa was given to Piedmont. As 
Metternich cynically said : “Republics are no longer in 
style.” 
T h e  same fear of an aggressive France showed itself in 
two other arrangements of the congress. In the south, 
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Switzerland was strengthened by the addition of new cantons 
and was neutralized by the common agreement of the pow- 
ers. I t  is perfectly evident to-day that although the neutral- 
ity of Switzerland has never been violated, she owes vastly 
more to the almost impregnable nature of her mountain 
fastnesses, especially under the conditions of modern war, 
and more still to the well-organized character of her militia, 
than she does to this idea of neutralization from which the 
Congress of Vienna expected so much. I t  is very difficult to 
see what rights neutralization has ever given to Switzerland, 
o r  to Belgium, o r  t o  Luxemburg which these states do  not 
have both in morality and in law as simple members of the 
family of nations. Sovereignty was destroyed or  lessened in 
certain very definite respects and nothing of value added in 
its place. T h e  world will never be safe for  a formally 
neutralized state until it is also safe for every independent 
and reasonably orderly state, however small o r  weak. 
In  a great many ways the union of Belgium and Holland 
under one monarch and one government was the most inter- 
esting territorial experiment originated at  Vienna. H o w  
completely would the success of that one arrangement have 
changed the whole future history of Europe and even of the 
world! Our diplomats thought that they had created a rich, 
strong state, endowed with a glorious colonial empire, popu- 
lated by a thrifty, courageous, and energetic people. One 
might imagine that when they created this new state they 
were not trying to place a protection in front of weak and 
defenceless Prussia against the aggression of fierce, warlike, 
aggressive France, the lustre of whose military prowess was 
scarcely dimmed even in this most glorious of all defeats; but 
rather that with prophetic eye they peered through the misty 
depths of one hundred crowded years to the time when this 
same Low Country, with all the agricultural wealth of Hol- 
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land, known even then, and with the unguessed industrial 
possibilities of Belgium, safe in its own proud strength, safe 
by the solemn promises of the nations, safe with its dykes, 
safe because the aggressor must inevitably see its rich island 
empire pass into the hands of a rival, would stand like a 
bulwark against fiercer and more relentless aggression than 
even Napoleon ever dreamed. Certainly they saw at least 
this, that Belgium and Holland together might withstand the 
shock of any blow which might fall on them from either east 
o r  west, and that with their great ports they would forever 
be the natural commercial highway to the heart of Europe. 
T h e  fact that this experiment failed so dismally within fif- 
teen years should not make us blind to  the essential nobility 
of the plan. It is true that the people of Belgium and Hol- 
land were divided by very substantial differences of religion, 
of culture, and of language. I suppose that the so-called prin- 
ciple of nationality can be violated either by separating 
people who want to be together o r  by uniting those who 
desire to  be separate. But the diplomats of Vienna did not 
lay much store by this new motto, which seemed to rise like 
an unholy exhalation from the smoke and bloodshed of the 
Revolution. And one must confess that, however valuable 
the idea of nationality may be as a general principle, it 
has not always been synonymous with liberty, and has 
sometimes been actually violated with enduring success. 
Other considerations, historical and practical, have deter- 
mined the frontiers of nations and the composition of their 
citizenship. At least in the cases of the two republics of 
Switzerland and of the United States, one is strong in spite 
of very great differences in language, religion, and race, 
while the other is proud of the wonderful assimilative power 
of its institutions. One only needs to go back to the jeal- 
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ousies and rivalries which separated the thirteen colonies to 
see that an even greater experiment in union might easily 
have failed. If William of Orange, proud heir of a thrice 
distinguished name, had been more wise and tactful, if there 
had been enough political wisdom to devise a looser form of 
union in which the two peoples might have had the real 
strength of union without the galling shackles of complete 
amalgamation, even the great differences in history and in 
racial sympathy between the two peoples might well have 
been overcome to the lasting good of all. To-day we should 
certainly be living in a very different world. 
I n  one other case the congress united dissimilar peoples, 
when it gave Norway to Sweden in return for Finland, which 
Bernadotte had yielded to  Alexander as f a r  back as 1812. 
This  case was somewhat different from the union of Belgium 
and Holland, for  each of the two had its own national his- 
tory and traditions and the economic interests of the two 
peoples were certainly more distinct; but even with all these 
disadvantages, the union endured under a looser form than 
the one attempted for  Belgium and Holland until our own 
day. 
In  arranging the Belgian line with the new Prussian terri- 
tories on the Rhine, the chief idea was to secure a frontier 
as straight and easily defended as possible, a policy which 
was certainly carried out very successfully, as a glance at the 
map will show. This is significant as a test of the contention 
which was made in 1914 that Germany had to invade Bel- 
gium for  fear of  being invaded herself. Every foot of her 
western frontier north of Switzerland has been selected 
within a hundred years by Prussia herself, and with military 
considerations specifically in mind. After the Germans are  
driven out of Belgium and northern France by allied armies, 
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there is some hint in this of the difficulty of the problem 
which still remains ahead i f  it is necessary to carry the cam- 
paign still farther. 
Most of the arrangements which we have discussed were 
already formulated, a t  least roughly, a t  the time of the 
peace which was signed in Paris after Napoleon’s abdi- 
cation. T h e  eight powers which signed this peace then 
agreed to meet in Vienna within two months to “complete 
the provisions of that treaty.” I t  was not until the middle 
of September that representatives of the four great powers 
which had defeated Napoleon arrived a t  the capital of 
Austria. Gentz, the Austrian representative, has stated 
with remarkable frankness the spirit of that meeting, which 
contrasted so strangely with the high hopes which all lib- 
erals had entertained during the summer. His statement 
makes one somewhat pessimistic unless the liberal forces of 
the world are very much more watchful and powerful to-day 
than they were in 1814. “The grand phrases,’’ he says, 
“such as ‘the regeneration of the political system of Europe,’ 
‘a lasting peace founded on the just division of strength,’ 
were uttered to tranquillize the people, and to give an air 
of dignity and grandeur to this solemn assembly; but the real 
purpose was to divide among the conquerors the spoils taken 
from the vanquished.” 
T h e  committee of the four great powers soon showed that 
they had no intention at all of allowing any one else to have 
any real part  in the deliberations. They were planning to 
have everything cut and dried to announce to the rest when 
they arrived, quite after the fashion of a modern political 
convention. When Talleyrand left Paris he said, “I am 
probably going to play a very sorry part.” When he reached 
Vienna he realized that it was no place at all for a modest 
man, and modesty was certainly not one of our ex-bishop’s 
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besetting sins. In  their first interview he said to  Metternich, 
who was acting as the master of ceremonies, that he “was 
both able and knew how to sit.’) Metternich took the hint, 
and decided to ask the representatives of Spain and France 
to meet at his house on the evening of September 30, along 
with the four. Talleyrand managed to get a good seat near 
the head of the table, and Castlereagh, the very pompous 
English representative, turned to him and said: “The object 
of to-day’s conference is to make you acquainted with what 
the four courts have done since we have been here.” Then  
to Metternich : “You have the protocol of the allies.” “Allies 
against whom?” said Talleyrand quietly. “Napoleon is on 
the island of Elba. If there are still allied powers, then I 
am an intruder here.” “We used the word only for  brevity.” 
“Brevity, my lord, is valuable, but accuracy is still better.” 
In  a later conference of the self-appointed committee, Tal-  
leyrand was admitted to a full share in the deliberations. 
At  this time he was posing as the champion of all the little 
powers, and especially of Saxony, in the name of the prin- 
ciple of legitimacy. Prussia was fully determined that Sax- 
ony should be hers as one of the spoils of war. Talleyrand 
made the seemingly innocent proposal that when the con- 
gress should meet it should be carried on according to the 
public law. Since all the powers had agreed that the idea 
of legitimacy was a part  of that law, one can easily see the 
drift of this proposal. T h e  Prussian, Hardenberg, who 
was very deaf, just managed to catch the expression. H e  
leaped to his feet, pounding the table with his fist, and 
shouted : “No,  sir ; public law is a useless phrase. Why say 
that we shall act according to public law? . . . What  has 
public law to do here?” “This,” answered the former grand 
chamberlain of Napoleon : “that it sends you here,” fo r  
without public law Prussia would have perished a t  Jena. So 
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Talleyrand managed to set the committee by the ears over 
the partition of Saxony and the fate of Poland, and at  the 
same moment gained for his own discredited country such a 
place that it practically became the arbiter of the delibera- 
tions, and the foreign minister of Louis XVII I  gave his mas- 
ter an influence such as no French king had had since the 
days of the one who could say with truth: “L’Ctat, c’est 
moi I” 
It must be confessed that after the French representative 
gained for himself so prominent a place in the committee of 
the great powers, he showed little further zeal in the matter 
of assembling the actual congress, and the strangest thing 
about the Congress of Vienna is that in the strictest sense 
there never was any congress at all. Although more than a 
hundred kings, princes, and diplomats were present in the 
city, they never were asked to assemble in one room to de- 
liberate. T h e  leaders of the congress simply met together 
in more o r  less self-appointed committees, very often delib- 
erated informally before dinner in the evening, o r  else 
intrigued secretly behind one another’s backs. The  nearest 
approach to an actual congress was a committee of eight 
powers, including the five great powers of the day and, in 
addition, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, which met occasion- 
ally a t  Metternich’s house and appointed other subcommit- 
tees to deal with special problems.1 This  committee had 
Metternich as chairman and Gentz as secretary. I sup- 
pose it is inevitable that in any great assembly which is to  
make arrangements of an intricate kind, the real work must 
be done by committees. But a t  Vienna there was no one to  
insist that the work of these small bodies should be finally 
reported to the main assembly. T h e  arrangements which 
1 One important subcommittee organized the German Confederation. An- 
other did the same for Switzerland. 
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were made in these devious and undemocratic ways were 
finally gathered together into what was called the final act 
of  the Congress of Vienna and signed just a few days before 
the battle of Waterloo. 
Outwardly the congress seemed an assembly of notables 
bent on pleasure alone. Vienna spent a sum equivalent to at 
least fifty thousand dollars a day on the entertainment of its 
guests. One who was there tells us: “The emperors dance, 
Metternich dances, Castlereagh dances. Only the Prince de 
Talleyrand does not dance,” having a club-foot. “ H e  plays 
whist.” I t  seemed to  the Prince de Ligne, as it must also 
have seemed to  an eagerly waiting world, so soon to  be 
disillusioned when it found back of the mask of fine phrases 
the same old selfishness and greed, that “the congress danced 
but did not advance.” This  same prince found himself about 
to  die in the midst of the celebrations, and as he died he 
said: “I am preparing for  the members of this congress a 
new amusement, the obsequies of a field marshal, a cavalier 
of the Golden Fleece.” 
Under all this appearance of gaiety there was enough of 
bitterness and of hatred. This  was directed especially 
against Prussia and Russia, which had agreed, under the 
influence of Stein, that one was to  receive Saxony and the 
other Poland. T o  these arrangements Austria was bitterly 
opposed, and Talleyrand made skilful use of the occasion to  
make himself leader of the opposition. England at first had 
her hands tied on account of the war against the United 
States. H e r  veteran soldiers had burned Washington in 
August and were soon to  meet the sharpshooters of Andrew 
Jackson at  New Orleans. On December 24 the peace of 
Ghent was signed with the United States, not so much, as 
Clay fondly believed, on account of his skill as a diplomat, 
but because there was every likelihood of even more stirring 
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days in Europe. If Napoleon had landed from Elba in 
January instead of in March, he would have found his 
enemies divided in their councils and have had good chances 
of success. F o r  on January 3, England, Austria, and France 
signed a secret treaty against the two great powers of the 
East.1 But in the weeks which followed the differences were 
finally compromised and the famous arrangements were made 
by which Prussia received not only the fertile lands on the 
banks of the Rhine which had been occupied by France since 
1794, but also Swedish Pomerania and the upper half of the 
kingdom of Saxony, which, in the language of the day, 
brought her population to ten milliop souls! Russia was 
satisfied with a large part  of Poland, to which Alexander 
agreed to give a liberal constitution; and Austria gained the 
rich valley of the Po in northern Italy. England was con- 
tent, for  the kingdom of Hanover, which was under her 
king, was enlarged until it occupied all the southern coast 
of the North Sea not already held by other small powers, 
thus making the already dangerous Prussia a purely Baltic 
power. Peace left Great Britain the undisputed mistress of 
the seas. 
Modern Germans have sometimes blamed the Congress 
of Vienna for  not having given them Alsace and Lorraine, 
which is like blaming Adam for  not having invented gun- 
powder. T h e  bare idea had indeed been advocated, but until 
the congress had adjourned it does not seem to have en- 
tered any one’s head as a serious political possibility that 
these provinces should belong to any one except France. 
Stein, the great Prussian statesman who acted as one of 
Alexander’s chief advisers at the congress, was bitterly dis- 
appointed not to receive the whole of Saxony as he had 
1Napoleon found a copy of this treaty on the table of the French king 
when he arrived in Paris and, characteristically, sent it to Alexander. 
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hoped, but he was well satisfied with the eastern frontier, 
as he well might be. For  Prussia had acquired a population 
as numerous as at the time of her greatest extent, and one 
vastly more homogeneous. Not  so much by the help of the 
weak Frederick William and of the deaf Hardenberg, but 
through Stein and Alexander of Russia, she had lost Poles 
and gained Germans. H e r  boundaries gave her the central 
position which made her the natural leader of the future 
German Empire, and which has proved of such inestimable 
military value in the present war. H e r  real grievance 
against the diplomats of Vienna lay in the north and centre, 
where Hanover, under the English king, lay like a great 
wedge cutting her territories in two and shutting her off 
effectually from the sea. I t  was not until almost half a cen- 
tury later that Prussia acquired a single important window 
which looked out toward the open Atlantic. 
T h e  return of Napoleon found all these arrangements 
virtually completed, and a great fear did that for  unity 
which nine months of discussion had been unable to accom- 
plish. As a result of the Hundred Days and the cowardice 
of his soldiers,l Murat  was to lose his throne and life; 
France, too, was to give up a little of the very favorable 
frontier which the genius of Talleyrand had secured for  her ; 
but the final act of the congress was expected to usher in a 
new age of peace and good will, under wise kings and kindly 
landlords, after the Corsican should have ceased from 
troubling and the weary peoples be at rest, and the battle of 
Waterloo seemed to place the seal of a divine approval on 
its deeds. 
1 It was of these soldiers that their former king said: “You may dress them 
in blue, or you may dress them in green, or you may dress them in red, but 
any way you dress them they will run!” 
